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PROPOSAL
The victorious Sandinistas and their governing junta stood on the
threshold of a Nicaragua eager to be transformed form the exploited,
dependent, and terribly poor nation-state it had been virturally since its
independence from Spain into a truly new society based on popular will and
welfare.

After a decade of governing with this goal in sight, however, the

Sandinista government led by President Daniel Ortega was defeated in the
1990 elections.

I will examine this electoral defeat as the last in a series of

setbacks that prevented a revolutionary society from emerging.

I will

attempt to demonstrate how it was that despite the overwhelming support of
the Nicaraguan people, substantial foreign assistance, and a clear policy
agenda, the Sandinistas failed.

I will also attempt to explain that failure as

a result of their inability to withstand a sustained armed civil conflict, and
of their inability to diversify their monoclutural economic system to break
their historic pattern of dependency.

INTRODUCTION: A BRIEF HISTORY OF NICARAGUA, 1933 - PRESENT
The United States Marines occupied Nicaragua almost continuously from
1912 to 1933.

In order to insure the continued internal stability of the

small, agrarian' country, they left in their place the commander of the
U. S. -trained National Guard, Anastasio Somoza Garc{a. 1

His authoritarian

rule would continue until his assassination in 1956, followed by another,
more brutal dictatorship under his son, Anastasio Somoza Debayle.

It was

under his regime that the leftist opposition born in Nicaragua's countryside
evolved into the revolutionary movement known as the Sandinistas.

Deriving

their ideological foundations from both the Cuban revolution and from the
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popular revolutionary leader, Augusto Ces~r Sandino, the Sandinista
movement gradually gained wide support among the vast majority of
Nicaragua's large agrarian population and urban workers throughout the
1960's and 70's.

Following a huge mobilization of the revolutionary forces,

the Frente Sandinista de Liberaci6n Nacional (FSLN) finally took power in
1979, forcing Somoza to flee the country.
The decade that followed was, in large part, the result of the FSLN's
attempt to produce a total social and political revolution consistent with their
vision of a more equitable Nicaraguan society.

The new marxist government

instituted sweeping reforms in the economy and the government, and
pursued aggressive policies to attack a number of the nation's serious social
and economic problems.

After ten years under the revolutionary regime,

however, Nicaragua remained plagued by many of the same problems that had
inspired the armed opposition against Somoza.

The FSLN was, in fact,

defeated in the elections of 1990 and replaced by the more centrist
government of Violetta Chamorro, a long-time leader of the opposition to the
revolutionary government.

Her administration, however, faces most of the

same challenges the Sandinista government unsuccessfully confronted.
The Somozas
The

u. S.

hoped to accomplish three objectives in establishing the

National Guard: to replace Nicaragua's old army and police with a central,
well-trained and well-equipped military force; to establish internal order;
and to make the military a non-political force with the task of preserving a
constitutional government and free elections. 2

Although the second objective

was by far the most vital to U. S. policymakers, the third is particularly
ironic in that the Guard became perhaps the most politicized entity in
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Nicaragua throughout both the Somoza regimes.

The installation of Somoza

in 1933 marked the beginning of a long and violent family dynasty, committed
only to enhancing and preserving the power of the Somozas through
unprecedented oppression and corruption. 3

After the 1932 elections,

supervised by occupying U. S. forces, Somoza Garda was named to the post
of Jefe Director of the National Guard, which had quickly evolved into the
most capable army Nicaragua had ever had.

Somoza would soon utilize its

forces as his personal instrument of domestic political oppression. 4

By

February of 1934, he had already ordered the assassination of Sandino, thus
eliminating the largest obstacle to his recent ascension to power.

Though

there are conflicting accounts and interpretations concerning Sandino's
assassination, Somoza--whether reluctantly or with great conviction, ordered
the murder to be carried out by members of the National Guard.
By 1937, Somoza Garc{a had been officially inaugurated as the President
of Nicaragua, thus beginning a forty-two year era of authoritarian rule and
tyranny.

During his first term, Somoza began consolidating his power and

increasing his own wealth at the expense of the national treasury and the
nation's poor.

His personal holdings, which soon reached into both the

industrial and agrarian sectors, combined with his influence over the
command of the Guardia formed an immensely profitable personal network
between the government, the economy, and the military. 5

The President was

also able to recognize and take full advantage of the shift in
U. S. - Nicaraguan policy to one of non-intervention. The reluctance of the
Truman administration to interfere with the Somoza inner circle facilitated his
ascension to, and consolidation of supreme political and economic power.
When his term as President was due to expire in 1947, Somoza selected
Leonardo ArgUello to be his successor on the Liberal Party ticket.
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Following

a fraudulent election administered and overseen by the National Guard,
Argiiello was installed as President.

Determined to assert his authority and

prove he was no puppet, however, Argiiello tried to make staff changes
among the Guard officers without notifying Somoza.

Less than one month

later, he was deposed and replaced by the dictator, thus establishing a
pattern of illegal succession that would characterize Somoza rule in the years
ahead. B

Such an overtly anti-democratic maneuver, however, left 'the U.S.

government no choice but to withhold diplomatic recognition until 1948, when
it recognized the government of Somoza's uncle, Victor Manuel RomB:n y
Reyes.

Consistent with the trend of the previous decade, Somoza again

assumed the presidency when Ro~n y Reyes died in May 1950, less than
one year after giving up the post. 7
The dictator moved swiftly to insure the continuation of his rule,
seeking renewed military aid from the U. S. in 1951.

By 1953, Nicaragua had

negotiated such an agreement with the U.S. whose policymakers had been
convinced that Communists in Guatemala and Costa Rica posed a serious
threat to Central American security.

Somoza Garc{a skillfully used his

strategic position to gain special military, economic, and political concessions
from the U. S. government, and carefully maintained close personal
relationships with key members of the State Department until his
assassination in 1956.
Luis Somoza, who was the President of the Nicaraguan Congress,
assumed the presidency upon his father's death and appointed his younger
brother, Anastasio Somoza Debayle as commander of the National Guard and
of the Air Force. B

The two brothers would continue to rule what had

become their personal fiefdom until Luis' death in 1967, by which time the
younger Somoza had simultaneously achieved the presidency and command of
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the Guard. 9

The worst corruption and brutality of the Somoza period then

began to characterize the socio-political system.

Somoza Debayle was

determined to remain in power and to retain his position of wealth.

He

maintained both through blatant fraud and literal elimination of any political
opposition via the National Guard.

Like his father, "Tachito" carefully

cultivated personal relationships with U. S. officials.

Despite the atrocities

of his government, he was ever-mindful of maintaining the friendship of the
Unites States, and in particular, the State Department.'o
The 1970s, however, proved to be a decade of change in Nicaragua that
would finally bring about the fall of the dynasty.

In 1974, Somoza declared

a state of siege after a successful hostage operation by the Sandinistas that
humiliated the government and the National Guard. The crack down included
complete press censorship and the unleashing of the Guard on the
Nicaraguan population.

What ensued was nothing short of a reign of terror

that marked the beginning of Somoza Debayle's fall from power."

After the

1974 hostage incident, opposition to the dictatorship grew steadily, setting
off a brutal cycle of opposition and repression cUlminating in the 1979
Sandinista victory in what had become, by that time, a full-blown civil-war.
The Sandinistas
The FSLN was founded in 1962 by Carlos Fonseca Amador. With support
from Cuba, its explicit intent was to overthrow the Somozas through a revolt
fashioned after the 1959-1960 removal of Fulgencio Batista by Fidel Castro
and his followers.'2

Soon after the FSLN's founding, many of its

Cuban-trained guerrillas were diffused throughout the countryside to gain
the support of local peasants and to mobilize them.'3
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The Nicaraguan export

economy had long been at the mercy of international markets.

The landed

aristocracy whose estates produced export commodities experienced cyclical
booms characterized by major opportunities for employment, followed by
recurring market declines resulting in mass unemployment and starvation for
farm workers and their families. '4 The FSLN appealed to the needs of these
peasants, and to urban workers who were desperate for an end to the social
and economic vulnerability and political repression resulting from Somoza
rule.

Their aspirations proved to be the foundations for armed struggle

against Somoza and the National Guard that led to his overthrow. '5
Following the Sandinista victory, in accordance with the FSLN National
Directorate (DN), a junta was established as the formal, provisional
governing body. '6

This body faced the enormous task not only of literal

reconstruction of the country, but also of restructuring the entire social,
economic, and political environment in accordance with the goal of
broad- based, popular participation in national policy.

The Sandinistas

instituted far-reaching, innovative reforms in education and health care.
The economy was redesigned and reoriented toward revolutionary ends, while
it sought to maintain the cooperation of the traditional middle sectors.
Despite significant gains in literacy, medical facilities, women's rights, and
human rights, as the decade of the eighties drew to a close, the "new
Nicaragua" appeared to have failed to materialize and the Sandinista
government was defeated in the nation's first ever free elections.'6
Nicaragua's Future
Violeta Chamorro and her government inherited a Nicaraguan state and
socio-economic system in a state of total crisis.

Its gross national product

had, in fact, experienced a negative growth percentage rate every year
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after 1983, and the national treasury was nearly depleted. 19 The masses of
people who had been disappointed by Sandinista economic failures now looked
to Chamorro with a new, if somewhat skeptical, hope for socio-economic
relief, a monumental task virtually impossible to achieve given Nicaragua's
staggering foreign debt and utter lack of resources.
In addition to economic recovery, the new government also faced, like
the Sandinistas before them, the task of rebuilding the entire social system
after years of civil war and foreign intervention.

Tens of thousands of

armed Nicaraguans, both Contra· and Sandinista, remained a volatile element
present in almost every area of the country.

The diffusing of such a

potentially violent armed forces had to be carried out within the context of
transition from the military government of Daniel Ortega and the FSLN to the
civilian government of the Chamorro UNO coalition. It thus had to be
performed cautiously, with little room for error.
In short, the Nicaraguan socio-political system inherited by Chamorro
closely resembled that won by the Sandinistas over a decade earlier.

She

too, set out to eradicate the many social and especially economic problems for
the people of her country.

Although there were pledges of significant

international support for her government only hours after the UNO victory
was announced, the legacy of foreign intervention, particularly by the U. S.,
had to be overcome.

Most importantly, despite economic reforms instituted

by the Sandinistas, Nicaragua's economy remained heavily dependent on two
major export crops to earn the hard currency it needed to import finished
goods.

*

Confronted with such obstacles, .the rapid growth that so many
The term "Contra" is an abbreviated form of the Spanish word for the
counterrevolutionary forces in Nicaragua.
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Nicaraguans had come to expect under the Chamorro government is simply
not likely to materialize.

8

PRE-REVOLUTION NICARAGUA THROUGH 1979
Social Climate
Perhaps the most glaring legacy of the Somoza dynasty was the
miserable social climate in which the majority of the Nicaraguan people lived,
particularly the rural poor.

As is often the case in highly centralized

authoritarian systems in which only a handful of elites hold the largest
proportion of political and economic power, the Somoza inner circle amassed
immense and unprecedented wealth, while thousands of people were denied
even the most basic needs for survival.

While the Somozas dined with U. S.

State Department officials, children starved to death in the streets of
Managua and in the fields of the cotton plantations.

Education was

chronically inadequate; illiteracy rates were high even by underdeveloped
nations' standards, and high numbers of Nicaraguans had no access to
schools of any kind.

Serious shortages of medical facilities and supplies

produced both high infant mortality rates and a low life expectancy.

In

fact, Nicaragua ranked at or near the bottom of all Latin American countries
for social statistics throughout the Somoza period.
Nicaraguan society under the Somozas was a deeply traditional and,
therefore, highly unequal one.

As with the great disparities between the

quality of life for urban and rural citizens, workers and elites, men and
women held very different social roles and were afforded quite different
levels of justice within it.

This was, of course, largely attributed to the

concepts of marianismo and machismo, so prevalent in all traditional Latin
American cultures.

Within the boundaries of the role of women under the

concept of marianismo, the Nicaraguan woman, regardless of class, simply
did not possess the same legal rights as did her male counterpart.

9

Women of

all classes and backgrounds were legally subordinate to fathers or husbands,
while being expected to live by different moral standards that diminished
Nicaraguan men's legal and moral responsibilities, consistent with the
machismo concept.

In a moral code closely tied to the beliefs of the Roman

Catholic Church, women were charged with upholding the morality of the
family and were responsible for its spiritual development and well-being.
Conversely, men were largely exempt from this duty and were not legally
bound to support their families financially or to acknowledge and support the
children they fathered 'out of wedlock.
The result was a high rate of male desertion that left large numbers of
female-headed households living in poverty without any legal means to
require male financial responsibility.'

Married women working in rural areas

did not even receive the income they earned as wages, farm workers being
paid to the male head of a household for the work done by all members of
his family. 2

While adultery was strictly forbidden on religious and social

moral grounds for women, it was usually overlooked in the case of men.
Illegitimacy carried a serious social stigma for both mother and child,
regardless of socioeconomic status.

Advertising was blatantly sexist, with

virtually no legislation to regulate the industry in existence. 3

Overall,

Nicaraguan women during the Somoza years were less educated, had fewer
financial resources, were concentrated in less-skilled, lower-paying jobs, and
had fewer civil and legal rights than men.
The health care system for the majority of Nicarguans was miserably
inadequate under the Somozas.

Most Nicaraguans had extremely limited

access to sanitary drinking water and medical attention.

The average life

expectancy was 53 years and the infant mortality rate was 120 per 1,000 live
births. 4

The availability and quality of medical care was, like many other
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basic provisions, very unequally distributed between different segments of
the population.

Throughout the Somozas' rule, institutionalized health care

was virtually absent in most areas of the country.

Residents of the rural

areas typically had to travel for hours to reach even the most basic medical
attention.

Although access to and quality of health care was somewhat more

adequate in urban areas, hospitals were almost exclusively located in cities.
Rural dwellers, especially the poor, were left without even emergency
medical attention. 5

The facilities that were in existence were operated at

chronically low levels of efficiency and tended to be staffed with patronage_
employees and administrators far more concerned with their relationship to
the Somocista elites than for the people to whom they were to provide care.
Medical institutions competed with each other for the few resources that were
allocated by the Somoza government, usually at the expense of their
patients. B

The generally poor quality of Nicaraguan health care is perhaps

most plainly obvious as demonstrated by the fact that members of the Somoza
family elite travelled exclusively abroad for medical attention.

In fact, when

I

Somoza GarCIa was fatally shot in 1956, he was flown immediately to aU. S.
hospital in the Canal Zone. 7
Like health care, public education for the vast majority of Nicaraguans
under Somoza was either highly inadequate or non-existent.

Again, those in

urban areas had better access to educational facilities than their
counterparts in the countryside, but even in cities scarcely one half of the
population was literate.

In rural villages, illiteracy was over 80 percent. B

During the last decade of Somoza rule, education policy completely ignored
rural Nicaragua and was hardly a priority in the cities.

The disparity

between urban and rural education is painfully obvious from the demographic
statistics for the 1970s.

Over two-thirds of all students were from urban
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backgrounds, while less than five percent of all children from agrarian
backgrounds even finished primary school. 9

Higher education existed solely

to educate the elite children who were fortunate enough to attend the very
limited numbers of Nicaraguan colleges, most of which were structured to fit
the business interests of the Somocistas.

Most wealthy students, however,

were educated in the U. S. and trained to uphold the traditional military and
economic power structure of their homeland.
Such gross neglect of domestic education was not a random omission on
the part of the Somoza government.

Denying access to education to the

middle classes and, especially to the unskilled urban and rural poor was
highly functional in maintaining the dictatorship in a position of supreme
power and preserving its complete domination of Nicaragua's political,
economic, and social life. >0

Education of the large number of Nicaragua's

workers presented a serious threat to the traditional order of the country.
It was, in fact, by design that the Somoza regime provided very little public

education, the assumption being that the uneducated posed less of a threat
to the status quo. n

Illiteracy, therefore, served as a means to insure the

passivity of the poor and to provide Nicaraguan elites with a large pool of
unskilled labor that was crucial to the agroexport economy on which they
depended.

Such an education system created generation after generation of

poor, illiterate, landless workers who were dependent on the coffee and
cotton plantations for securing employment and survival. >2
The Roman Catholic Church had always played an important role in the
social development of the Nicaraguan social system.

Under the Somozas, the

Church did not operate as a single, cohesive unit with a unified policy.
fact, its position changed significantly throughout this period.

This change,

in part, was a result of the dual nature of its structure; that is, its two
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elements:

the Church hierarchy and official Church, and the so-called

people's Church.

The former consisted of the bishops who decreed official

policy for their respective dioceses; the latter encompassed parish priests
and laypeople who worked and lived with the largely poor congregation.
The official Church was historically the more conservative, in the sense that
its position virtually always reflected a desire to maintain the status quo.
The "popular" Church, on the other hand, became increasingly more
concerned with social justice and providing for the needs of its members in
as self-sufficient a manner as possible.

This policy shift occurred gradually

during the century between independence from Spain and the installation by
the U. S. of the Somoza dynasty.
Consistent with the traditional dual-hierarchy characterization, the
official Church was generally supportive of the Somoza governments which
subsequently allowed traditional ecclesiastical officials considerable influence
within society. >3

This relationship had its historical beginnings in the

post- Independence alliance between the Church and the Conservative Party,
which agreed to protect Church privileges within Nicaraguan society. >4
Although the Somozas were powers within the Liberal Party, their
arrangement with the bishops was the same.

The Church, which held a

monopoly on religion and social influence for the masses, contributed
important political endorsements for the dictators in exchange for political
favors and concessions from the Somoza government.

The bishops complied

absolutely with the government of Somoza Garc{a and therefore were allowed
to continue exercising control over religious instruction, their influence over
many social laws, and the ownership of substantial property. >5

Because

Somoza Garda did not impose traditionally liberal anti-clerical measures on
the Church, it was simply in their best interest to support his regime.
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This

mutually beneficial relationship continued with the governments of the
younger Somozas until 1970, when Church support began to erode and,
ultimately shifted to a position of active opposition.'s
The Vatican II Council and the Alliance for Progress provided the
Church with the inspiration to pursue social change for Nicaragua.

Members

of the people's Church had long been engaged in attending to the social
needs of their congregations; needs which had grown more and more
desperate as Somoza rule wore on.

With the spark of support from the

bishops, however, the movement of laypeople for social justice gained
considerable momentum.'7

Soon the Church hierarchy recognized that the

Somoza regime, and the economic system perpetuated by it, represented the
structural bias responsible for the oppression and starvation of the majority
of Nicaraguans.

Although Church opposition to Somoza was not unanimous,

as some bishops were, in fact, fearful of challenging the dictator, its
members provided a significant and critical support to the movement that
brought down the dynasty.'8
Economic Climate
The Somocista political economy played an important part in producing
the vast inequality and deprivation that characterized the country.
Throughout its history, as today, its economy has been completely dependent
on agricultural exports to survive.

This largely unregulated monocultural

system was responsible for an extreme polarization in Nicaraguan society.
Almost all productive land was held by a tiny percentage of the popUlation
who in turn required a large cheap labor pool in order to profit from the
production of export crops.

Such a system also insured that landed elites

retained and expanded their holdings from decade to decade.
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Somoza Garda was installed as the head of the National Guard at the
height of a world depression that produced nothing short of economic
collapse.

Coffee, sugar, and banana prices plunged on the world market in

the early 1930s, leaving the country destitute and without its only sources
of revenue.

The landholding exporters subsequently increased cultivation of

their crops in order to compensate for decreased revenues, a behavior
pattern which resulted in a further decline in prices. 19

Smaller landholders

were pushed off their lands by plantation owners as arable land became more
and more concentrated into the hands of upper class elites.
During World War II, economic activity was accelerated somewhat as the
Allies' demand for raw materials boosted aggregate export income.

This in

turn, however, created an overwhelming dependency on the U. S. market to
import its goods. 20

As the war drew to a close and the demand for these

materials vaporized, Nicaragua again plunged into a recession that lasted for
the remainder of the decade.

Somoza's answer to these economic troubles

was a temporarily successful diversification of export agriculture and a huge
increase in cotton planting during the 1950s.

Under the Alliance for

Progress from 1962 to 1970, with a huge infusion of economic aid from the
. United States and international lending institutions, the economy experienced
a period of substantial growth in terms of production and development. 21
Its overall trade figures increased at an annual rate of ten percent during
the 1960s, and its level of dependence on cotton and coffee declined as a
result of limited diversification.
The decade of the 1970s, however, brought economic problems that
could not easily be dealt with, and which were intensified by the internal
turmoil surrounding the growing revolutionary movement and its repression
by the Somoza government.

Following the 1972 earthquake that devastated

15

Managua, the country began a period of heavy foreign borrowing that would
continue and in fact accelerate until the fall of Somoza by which time the
debt had reached $1.15 billion. 22

During this period, the economy moved

through cycles of significant gains to intense lows, accompanied by high
unemployment and inflation.

Between 1972 and 1979, when it became evident

that the Sandinistas were close to victory, total productivity had decreased
by 25 percent and the inflation rate had reached more than 80 percent. 23
The boom and bust cycles that characterized the economy under Somoza
were most apparent in the agrarian sector, and during most of the period of
the dictatorship, in coffee cultivation and its performance on the world
market.

Coffee was its single largest industry in terms of employment, land

under cultivation, and proportion of the gross domestic product. 24

Despite

several attempts to introduce other crops for diversification, Nicaragua
continued to rely on coffee for the capital it needed to import finished
goods, a state of affairs which only served to solidify its position as a
dependent raw-materials exporting nation-state. 25
During the 1950s however, the Nicaraguan agricultural sector, as did
those of other Third World countries, experienced an unprecedented cotton
boom.

In a successful attempt to increase his personal wealth by means of

exploiting the then high prices on the world market, Somoza Debayle
increased cotton production by 120 fold by 1955, when the extent of its
cultivation reached a peak of 40 percent of the country's cultivated land. 26
The world cotton price proved to be extremely profitable for the Somoza
family and Nicaragua's other landholding elites while, at the same time, it
was devastating for the small farmers displaced by the boom and left without
employment after it had ended.

After the cotton period ended, the
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agricultural sector again turned to coffee as its main focus, while investing
some resources in beef, tobacco, and sugar as well.
Nicaragua had remained self-sufficient in basic food crop production
until cotton was introduced for large-scale export.

After this period, as the

population inexorably increased, food crop production decreased, and by the
mid-1950s, the country was forced to import food to feed its population,
setting off a rapid acceleration of foreign debt in the late 1950s.

This

policy, however, proved to be very beneficial for Somoza and his elite circle
of agricultural producers who were able to increase their landholdings and
profit from the increased export revenues.

It was, however, financially

crippling for the small farmers and rural workers who were at the mercy of
the export economy for their income, and who were forced to pay higher
prices for imported food that could have been grown on Nicaraguan soil. 27
Agricultural sector behavior, therefore, was a clear example of how the
self-serving policies of the government produced the exploitation of the poor
and working classes of the country and set off wildly fluctuating cycles of
prosperity and depression in the overall economy.
The state of the industrial sector, like the rest of the nation's
economy, was subject to the rural, agricultural peaks and recessions that
characterized the Somoza period.

Although industry employed far fewer

workers and contributed much less to the nation's income than agriculture, it
became an important economic force in the more populous, urban areas of
I

Managua and Leon.

Its significance increased in the 1950s, particularly

when Somoza Debayle began to take a personal interest in industry and
manipulated industrial policies so as to increase his own wealth.

Although

its contribution to Nicaragua's GDP was hardly marked, the industrial sector
quickly became an important national concern when Somoza began acquiring
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industrial properties to offset the losses he incurred during the recession of
the late 1950s. 28

Others of his personal friends did the same, buying

factories in the cities and temporarily boosting the industrial sector.

This

injection of capital investment in industry had important implications for the
urban working class which grew significantly during, this period.
The Alliance for Progress brought new capital resources to the Latin
American nations and spawned the Central American Commom Market (CACM),
and both developments contributed to the growth of the Nicaraguan
industrial sector.

Increased capital allowed construction and improvement of

factories, light industry, and other mechanized operations.

The CACM

provided a new and large market for Nicaragua's agricultural exports and,
therefore, increased activity in the industrial processing of those goods. 29
Following this period of growth, however, a recession settled in across the
region throughout the 1970s.

The financial burden fell most heavily upon

the members of the newly developed industrial working class, the majority of
whom were concentrated in urban industrial centers where employment
became increasingly difficult to secure.

This situation intensified as the

Somoza government continued to impose policy favorable to agricultural
elites, to the detriment of the working class. 30 These policies only
contributed to the ever-increasing inequality between the economic classes.
The result was the growth of volatile labor unrest, manifest in periodic
strikes that led to violent oppression by the National Guard, particularly
after the Sandinista movement had gained momentum.

In the industrial

sector, therefore, as in agriculture, the policies of the Somoza dynasty
ultimately inspired the mass mobilization and armed insurrection that brought
down the dictator.

18

The personal wealth of the Somoza family, within the context of
Nicaragua's dependent and underdeveloped economy, cannot be accurately
measured.

Although he was of humble beginnings, Somoza Garda amassed

his fortune while serving as Jefe Director of the National Guard.

His

moneymaking techniques generally involved the granting of political
concessions for bribes and other similar means of exploiting his position.
Through such business transactions, Somoza developed important
relationships with both domestic elites and foreign investors with whom he
would collaborate to push Nicaragua's economy further into a state of
dependency.31 Somoza Garda also extracted wealth from thriving Nicaraguan
gambling, prostitution, and other illegal activities, receiving bribes in
exchange for preventing the national police from interfering with them.

In

addition to these and other illegal ventures, Somoza was also involved in
several legitimate businesses, including agricultural cultivation and
production, industry, infrastructure development, and mining.

Few areas of

the economy with profit earning potential escaped his attention, and by the
1940s, he was one of the wealthiest men in Nicaragua and in fact, in all of
Central America. 32

Somoza then used his tremendous power within the

government to write himself and his inner circle secret loans to finance
additional industrial projects. By 1945 his fortune had grown to almost $60
million. 33
Luis and Anstasio Somoza Debayle were born into the most powerful
family in Nicaragua, and were socialized in this advantageous position, and
taught to preserve it at all costs.

Like their father, the Somoza brothers

cultivated relationships with key domestic and foreign economic players to
insure a continued successful cooperative effort for personal gain.

When

Somoza Debayle officially assumed power after Luis death, he continued to
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enforce regulatory legislation that eliminated competing companies from
infringing on his economic operations.

He was able to use his virtually total

governmental power to channel into his personal bank accounts millions of
dollars in foreign relief funds after the Managua earthquake disaster in 1972.
These funds were then used illegally to fund reconstruction efforts that
generated even more graft and profit for his family and coterie of friends. 34
According to some sources, before his fall from power in 1979, Somoza
Debayle's annual income was estimated to be between 40 and 50 percent of
Nicaragua's gross domestic product. 35

The Somoza family fortune became the

most obvious and blatant example of the economic exploitation, dependency,
and disparity of the period.
Political Climate
Prior to 1979, the Nicaraguan political structure was designed to
maintain the interests of the elite circle of the Somozas and their supporters.
As was the case in the national economy, the dictator and his allies enjoyed
absolute control of an extremely centralized government apparatus comprised
of the executive bureaucracy, the Nicaraguan Congress, and the armed
'forces, particularly the National Guard.

Key positions in each branch of the

government were occupied only by the closest of friends and loyal political
allies, preferably a family member, in order to insure that the decisions of
the officials would be consistent with the Somozas' agenda. 36 Although the
Somozas were the de facto government authority from the time the U. S.
Marines withdrew from Nicaragua in 1933 until the Sandinista revolution
46 years later, a Somoza did not consistently hold the title of President
throughout the entire period.

Somoza Garc{a held the position of Jefe

Director of the National Guard, a post which was technically subsumed under
the governmental powers of the President, Juan Bautista Sacasa.
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Through a

series of extralegal political maneuvers and the manipulation of key positions
within the command level of the Guard, Somoza was soon able to exercise his
own- political agenda over President Sacasa's faint objections. 37

He finally

ousted Sacasa in 1936 and had himself declared President, thus
simultaneously controlling both the government apparatus and the military.
His three sons all served as commanders in the Guard promoting their
father's policies through any necessary means.

This system of family control

of both formal governmental and military power centers continued and
expanded during the regimes of the younger Somozas, although they did not
consistently hold the title of President throughout the entire period.
During this era, as had been the case throughout most of Nicaragua's
history, the government experienced the power struggles between the Liberal
and Conservative parties as most citizens and nearly all elites were affiliated
with one of the twO. 38

Unlike a conventional democratic two-party system,

however, the Nicaraguan government structure was controlled almost
completely by the party of the current dictator, while the other served the
opposition until it gained power.

This system was characterized by constant

conflict, divisions, and weak coalitions built around the personal interests
and relationships of socio-economic elites.

The Somozas were members of the

Liberal Party and it was under their control that this traditionally
personalistic political organization gained absolute power at the expense of
those who did not identify with it. 39
Loyal members of the Liberal Party benefitted from the same fraudulent
elections that maintained the Somozas in control of the presidency.
Congressional officials appointed Liberal judges and filled the ranks of the
bureaucracy with those individuals most likely to remain compliant with their
policies and political interests.

Most of the ideological base for the two

21

parties, however, had deteriorated into an incohesive elitist clustering of
personal cliques by the time of the 1933 installation of Somoza Garda. 4 0

One

notable exception was the periodic presence of young members of the
Conservative Party who became active in the party hoping for political
change.

Most of these reformist Conservatives, however, were exiled,

imprisoned, or isolated by these party leaders who feared being associated
with any opposition to Somoza.
Although the Conservative Party was ineffectual under Somoza Garc{a,
it regained some of its former influence during the presidency of Lufs
Somoza and later under Somoza Debayle.

After his fraudulent election to the

presidency, Tachito sought to appease the Conservative faction by giving
them 40 percent of the seats in the National Assembly; a small concession
given that the Assembly exercised little real authority. 4'

Overall, both

Liberal and Conservative Parties,. like the government structure as a whole,
remained the personal, political organizations of the privileged elites, and to
some extent, the bourgeoisie, but remained insulated from the concerns and
participation of the masses.
When Somoza Garc{a moved to the forefront of Nicaraguan politics as an
influential member of the Liberal Party, all hopes for maintaining the National
Guard as an apolitical institution were dashed.

Instead, the military became

the Somozas' principle vehicle for consolidating and maintaining political
power and eliminating the opposition.

Because the position of top command

was always held by a members of the Somoza family, its actions were
guaranteed to support the dictator in the interest of self-preservation. 42
This also insured that plots against them would remain at the rank-in-file
level, and therefore easily be extinguished.

Somoza Garda carefully

garnered the unconditional psychological and emotional support of his
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Guardsmen by providing them with equipment, training, and salaries, and by
assuring them that their loyalty would be rewarded.

His use of the Guard

to repress his political opponents, employing extreme violence against often
innocent people, served to alienate its members from the civilian population
that grew to hate Somoza's military establishment.

Their isolation from

virtually all non-military Nicaraguans left them utterly dependent on the
Somozas and forced them into a stance of unquestioning defense and loyalty
at all costs." 3
The National Guard was given duties in all areas of the government
and, in fact, continued to expand its jurisdiction throughout the Somoza
period.

They were responsible for the postal service, immigration and

emigration, all imports of military hardware, national sanitation, all
communication media, the administration and oversight of elections, and the
very broad duty to maintain internal security.....

In addition to legal

activities, the Guard was also actively involved in regulating and collecting
the profits from the Somozas' wide and lucrative network of gambling,
prostitution, and political corruption.

Its first priority, however, was to

keep power concentrated in the dictatorship, and eliminate all internal
opposition to it.

Repression by the National Guard increased under Somoza

Debayle, who faced increasing internal opposition to his authority following
his brother Lu{s' death in 1967."5

In a futile attempt to remain in power,

he was forced to employ unprecedented violence against opposition from any
and all levels of society.

As his enemies continued to gain support for his

overthrow, only his Guardsmen remained loyal in the hopes of maintaining
their own position.
In the late 1960s the effects of over three decades of dynastic
domination became increasingly visible with the rise of the popular leftist
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movement of the FSLN.

In addition to the traditional opposition sources-

elements of the press, university students, and outspoken members of the
bourgeoisie--Somoza Debayle was confronted with increasingly frequent
uprisings by urban and rural workers demanding change.

The FSLN

movement began with a series of clandestine operations modeled after those
of Sandino's and Castro's guerrillas, increasing to the point that Somoza
imposed a state of siege in 1974. 46
Opposition growth accelerated both within Nicaragua and abroad.
Honduras served as a site of guerrilla bases for Sandinista camps, and Cuba
continued to provide training for strategists and field commanders, as well
as limited material assistance.

Even the United States, the long-time friend

and supporter of the Somozas, tapered off its substantial economic aid as
human rights abuses worsened.

Domestic opposition came from scores of

organizations including labor unions, political parties, and the popular
Catholic Church. 47

Perhaps the single most powerful event that mobilized

Nicarguans against Somoza was the January 1978 assassination of La Prensa
editor Pedro Joaqu{n Chamorro, a long-time opponent of the dictator.

As

the masses demonstrated in the streets, this action by Somoza compelled
many middle and upper class Nicaraguans to publicly call for his removal. 46
By January 1979, the dynasty was on an irreversible course to its
demise and political and economic elites began to flee the country in fear of
a victory by the revolutionaries.

Although membership in the National

Guard had reached an all-time high of 14,000 soldiers, the revolutionary
forces had grown far too large to be contained. 49

The FSLN launched its

"Final Offensive" in June 1979, covering key urban and rural areas and
quickly defeating the declining number of Guardsmen who were left to fight
in vain.

Somoza Debayle fled Nicaragua on July 17, the remnants of the

24

Guard quickly surrendered to FSLN forces, and Sandinista Nicaragua was
born.
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NICARAGUA UNDER THE SANDINISTAS
Social Conditions and Policy
When the military junta of the newborn Sandinista government arrived
in Managua in July of 1979, they brought with them the hopes and
preliminary plans for the "New Nicaragua", to be the result of a total social,
economic, and political revolution.

As victorious civilian revolutionaries who

had taken up arms against Somoza raced through the streets elated at the
prospect of real change, members of the governing junta could not have
imagined the tremendous task that lay before them.

The scars of the

decades of military dictatorship, the insurrection, and oppression ran deep,
and although the military battle had temporarily subsided, the complete
reconstruction of their country was at the forefront of their agenda.
Countless cities and villages had been destroyed leaving thousands of
Nicaraguans homeless and without employment.

Economic production had

virtually ceased, as many of the farm workers were fighting the battles of
the insurrection's final days.

Scarcely one half of the population was able

to read about the Sandinista victory and starvation was still a reality for
thousands in urban and rural areas alike.
Despite these overwhelming internal obstacles to progress, the FSLN
met perhaps its greatest challenge in 'opposition from the government of the
United States.

In the face of diplomatic and economic sanctions, then

outright military action, however, the Sandinistas attempted to maintain a
general policy of non-alignment.

They did develop close ties with Cuba and

courted officials of the Soviet Union, always insisting that their
revolutionary aims were not expansionist.

Their major objectives, in truth,

were related to the domestic needs of Nicaragua, and by the mid-1980s, the
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government simply did not have the resources for military expansion because
of counterrevolutionary activity within Nicaragua's borders.

Their explicit

goals in 1979, therefore, were to erase as completely as possible the
despotism and exploitation of the Somoza period in favor of popular
democracy based on mass political participation and national unity. 1
The FSLN's social policy was perhaps its most powerful vehicle for
producing change and, thus, represented its most successful endeavors.
Social service investments in 1980, in fact, accounted for 33.6 percent of the
government's total expenditures, and would remain at that level through
1984."

In addition, despite the degree of challenge presented by

Nicaragua's intense social problems, the new government had the benefit of
overwhelming support from is people for their new programs.

The

Sandinistas hoped to develop social programs which would channel support
for the revolution into a thorough national mobilization effort.

In a 1970

speech delivered by Carlos Fonseca Amador, the FSLN's objective was to
"achieve a profound change in their conditions of life. 'I"
In terms of financial investment, the immediate improvement of health
care was the Sandinistas' highest priority.

In terms of statistics, the

Somoza record was atrocious and major public health improvements became
the specific target of the revolutionary agenda. 4

Health care policy, which

was directed toward a vast expansion of preventative medicine and
mass-based health education, was administered by the newly created Ministry
of Health.

This department was the first of its kind in Nicaragua's history,

responsible for all health programs, facilities, personnel, and education.
Capitalizing on wide popular support, the government program enlisted the
. assistance of the people themselves for administration of a national
immunization campaign.

This effort included vaccinations for polio, measles,
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and malaria that reached an estimated 85 percent of its intended patients and
resulted in a drastic reduction in these infectious diseases."

In addition to

bringing health information to the public, FSLN policy also made strides in
institutionalized medical education.

New training programs and medical

schools were established to attempt to produce a dramatic increase in the
number of medical personnel available to staff the few existing health care
facilities.

By 1985, the number of students enrolled in medical school was

ten times that of 1979."

In order to improve curative care, the new

government instituted a program to dramatically increase the number of
hospitals and medical clinics, another method of utilizing popular support.
Volunteer workers assisted in the construction of such facilities and the
transportation of the medical supplies they were able to acquire.

Although

new FSLN government programs were limited in scope by scarce domestic
financial resources and inadequate humanitarian assistance from abroad, its
achievements were possible because Sandinista health care programs had the
overwhelming support of the Nicaraguan people.
This support proved crucial to Sandinista accomplishments of the in
health policy.

By virtually every health care index, Nicaraguan capabilities

improved dramatically within the first five years of the regime, and certainly
by the late 1980s. 7

The number of health care centers grew from 177 in

1977 to over 600 by 1985.

The infant mortality rate dropped from 120 per

1,000 live births in 1976 to 74 per 1,000 in 1982.

Previously widespread

diseases like polio and malaria had been all but eliminated, with very few
cases reported annually. S

Strong efforts to provide greater access to safe

drinking water and improved sanitation were equally successful, leading to
the distribution of over four thousand latrines.

Over 250 facilities for oral

rehydration and nutrition were set up, treating over 100,000 young children
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and drastically reducing the number of child deaths from thirst, the
ingestion of contaminated water, and starvation. 9

So successful were these

programs in bringing about change that the World Health Organization named
Nicaragua a "Model Nation in Health Attention" in 1983.'0

Overall,

Sandinista health care policy provided a fine example of real progress toward
revolutionary change and improved the quality of life for its people.
Although it did not receive nearly as much financial support as health
care, education was recipient of more popular support from volunteer
workers than any other Sandinista policy.

The National Literacy Crusade

was the first and most important education policy of the revolutionary
government.

Literacy had been a major theme in the FSLN's proposed plan

for a "new Nicaragua" and was closely tied to their notion of a fundamental
liberation for all Nicaraguan citizens. U

Ignorance and illiteracy had been a

major instrument of control for the Somozas and a painfully difficult social
problem for the Sandinista leaders.

Their initial plan, built around the

active nation-wide promotion of the Literacy Crusade, involved the
mass-mobilization of citizens at the grass-roots level to do nothing more than
to teach other Nicaraguans to read.

This collective effort was executed

under the direction of the Ministry of Education. >2

The Literacy Crusade

served two major functions: First, it provided a means for illiterate
Nicaraguans to participate more actively in the revolution and become more
productive members of society.

Second, it allowed the pro-FSLN messages to

become firmly entrenched in the beliefs of the people by teaching them to
read using Sandinista literature.
Nicaraguans both in the cities in and the countryside were bombarded
with propaganda calling for them to join the Crusade, and thereby created
an important sense of nationalism for the participants.
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They were made to

feel that they were not only improving themselves, but contributing to the
overall development of their country as well.

Volunteers became members of

the Popular Literacy Army (EPA) which was comprised largely of high school
and university students who had embraced the ideology and spirit of the
revolution and popular participation.

The most intensive portion of the

Crusade lasted five months and required a tremendous effort and commitment
both on the part of the organizers and participants as well.'3

It involved

sending urban student-teachers out into rural areas, often into remote areas
of the countryside to conduct classes in makeshift schools, churches, or
outdoors.
The second phase of the education policy called for the establishment of
a system of education to accommodate the newly literate population.

The

National Education Consultation began where the Literacy Crusade ended.

It

was designed to reform, restructure, and expand the nation's educational
system.'4

These goals involved primarily increasing the. accessibility of

education to all Nicaraguans free of charge.

The Ministry of Education

implemented plans for school construction, the expansion of existing
facilities, and an increase in the number of teachers and classes.

In

addition to expansion, the Sandinista policy also made provision for changing
school curriculum to fit the technical needs of post-Somoza society.

Through

these structural changes, schools were expected to educate citizens about
more productive methods in farming and industry, thus improving the labor
force and the overall economy. '5

The Sandinistas recognized the correlation

between ignorance and exploitation, illiteracy and underdevelopment, and
formed an education policy designed to remedy these traditional problems,
viewing it as a

social investment in Nicaragua's future.'B
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As was the case with health care, the Sandinistas made great progress
through their well-organized and highly supported education policy.
Illiteracy was reduced dramatically from over 80 percent in 1979 to 12
percent by 1981.

The number of students enrolled in institutionalized

education grew from less than 300,000 in 1979 to over one million only ten
years later. > 7

The Literacy Crusade itself became an umbrella program that

enlisted several smaller organizations into a highly functional network of
volunteers for other social programs.

Because of these efforts, Nicaragua

was awarded the UNESCO Literacy Prize in 1980. >8

The education programs,

despite their great proven successes, were stifled by the onset and growth
of the civil war with the Contras.

Perhaps because their Crusade did make

such significant progress, teachers and schools, particularly in the rural
areas, became the target of Contra aggression and destruction which
seriously hampered the success of the FSLN's mass-based education policy. >9
Improving the social position and legal rights of women was a major
Sandinista goal, beginning with the announcement of its Historic Program in
1969.

It was the Program's expressed intent to eliminate the systematic,

traditional discrimination practiced against Nicaraguan women, promote
equality among the sexes, and incorporate women into the revolutionary
government. 20

Such a profound change required a struggle not only against

pre-revolutionary law, but also against traditional, conservative social and
religious targets as well.

Sandinista leadership realized that the process of

emancipating women would not be completed through the simple passage of
laws; women had to be fully incorporated into the male-dominated society as
moral, physical, and intellectual equals.

In this respect, Sandinista

accomplishments in women's liberation came long before the 1979 victory.
The most substantial change came through their participation in mobilization
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efforts of the revolution, particularly their presence as combat personnel in
the Sandinista popular army.

It is estimated that 30 percent of the FSLN

combat forces were women. 21

Beyond their initial mobilization during the

revolutionary insurrection to overthrow Somoza, Nicaraguan women were
mobilized in large numbers for the Literacy Crusade and the health campaign
in 1980-81.

Their emancipation came quickly due to the fact that they were

not viewed as an auxiliary force in the military struggles, but as integral
and necessary for the success of the revolution's goals and objectives. 22
The integration of women into society became solidified as they developed
into a major component of the new armed forces, and founded the Nicaraguan
Women's Association (AMNLAE).

This organization, which became a

nationally visible player promoting egalitarian values between the sexes
within their society would never have been possible in the Nicaragua of the
Somozas. 23
In addition to their promoting the social elevation of women, the
Sandinistas also implemented revolutionary legislation to in order to secure
equal rights for women.

The Provision Law of 1982 made all adult members

of the family unit legally liable for maintaining it; that is, for providing it
with the income necessary to survive.

Its intent was to combat high rates

of male desertion that left large numbers of female-headed households without
the means to provide for them.

To further the ability of women to secure

an income, legislation was passed that required employers to pay each of
their adult workers individually, prohibiting the traditional practice of
paying only the male head of the household. 24

The Sandinista government's

support of equal rights legislation served to reinforce the trend toward the
social and economic equality that had begun during the 1970s.

FSLN policy

on women's rights was wholly consistent with their revolutionary aim to build
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a new country based on "the logic of the majority", correctly assuming that
"the majority" had to include Nicaraguan women. 28

As a result, women

continued to hold positions of command in the armed forces and leadership
positions in the government, labor unions, grass-roots organizations, and
businesses.
Economic Conditions and Policy
Despite the economic chaos inherited from Somoza, the junta members
established themselves in Managua optimistically armed with a well-detailed
economic plan to reconstruct and revitalize the economy.

Every sector and

industry had been devastated by the end of the insurrection.
policy had to address four basic economic dilemmas.

Sandinista

First, the

infrastructure required major repair of the damage inflicted by the war and
an administrative reorganization was needed to direct that repair effort.
Second, policymakers with very limited public resources were under pressure
to provide relief in the face of massive food shortages and extremely high
unemployment with fairly limited resources.

Third, economic conditions

mandated the payment on or renegotiation of Nicaragua's enormous external
debt.

Finally, the expressed aims of the revolution called for the

construction of an entirely new economic system. 28
Nicaragua's foreign debt in July, 1979 was measured at $1. 65 billion,
most of which was owed to the United States for agricultural, industrial, and
military imports.

The loss of human resources was equally great as 50,000

Nicaraguans representing two percent of the total population had died in the
revolution, and another 100,000 had been wounded. 3D

The United Nations'

estimates of the cost of infrastructure repair and restoration of industrial
capital damaged in the war was $481 million-a cost which appeared even more
prohibitive for reconstruction in light of Nicaragua's $1.5 billion flight of
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capital by the end of 1979. 31

The GDP fell concurrently with the wave of

decapitalization that followed the insurrection, eventually dropping to 1962
levels.

The productive land so vital to the overall economy remained

concentrated into the large plantations that had been operated by landed
elites, a significant number of whom remained in the country after the fall of
Somoza.

As a result, the most comprehensive portions of the revolutionary

program were directed at the agrarian sector.
The greatest challenge to marxist economic policy is the paradox of land
distribution and productivity; a problem that immediately confronted the
Sandinista leaders.

Because many campesinos and migrant farm laborers had

fought in the anti-Somocista insurrection, poor rural Nicaraguans quickly
demanded that elites land holdings be confiscated with the land equally
distributed among the workers and their families.

Complete equality in

distribution, however, is likely to produce a sharply downward shift in
production as small farms are cultivated primarily to produce food for
consumption by the families who live on them.

In such a scenario, the

economy is unable to produce the export crops necessary to obtain foreign
capital.

Without hard currency from abroad, the Sandinistas would not only

be unable to make payments on the huge foreign debt, but unable also to
import the capital goods it needed for reconstruction. 32

Any failure to

redistribute land, however, would surely destroy the the new government's
credibility and jeopardize the mass support needed to facilitate social and
economic recovery.
The immediate response was the confiscation and nationalization of the
1,500 estates (encompassing two million acres of land) owned by the Somoza
family and its closest allies.

This symbolic act of popular will was the first

step not only toward land distribution but also through moving toward
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agrarian reform.

A state agricultural sector was formed under the direction

of the newly created Ministry of Agricultural Development and Agrarian
Reform (MIDINRA) which was charged with the administration of all
Sandinista agrarian policy. 33

The MIDINRA quickly implemented a new

collective system of community-run estates assembled from the confiscated
Somoza holdings which were well-equipped for the processing of agroexport
crops.

Rural families joined cooperatives that provided them not only with

land to farm, but also with the mechanization needed to harvest and process
their crops, however out-dated the machinery was.

Through increased

levels of agrarian reform the Sandinistas hoped to raise the rural standard
of living, make the country self-sufficient in food production, and increase
the agroindustrial base to produce more foreign exchange income. 34
Despite their immediate program of land distribution, however,
two-thirds of all agricultural land would remain the property of owners
wealthy enough to employ laborers to work it.

By allowing these land

holders to retain ownership of their property, Sandinista leaders hoped to
maintain the support of the middle and upper-middle classes by protecting
their interests in spite of marxist policy changes; a practice for which they
would later be criticized.

On the assumption that these lands would remain

productive in private hands and maintain the agroexport economic base, the
MIDINRA officials made a conscious effort to negotiate with the middle-range
land holders. 35

Another source of policy input came from the Rural Workers

Association (ATe), a coalition of over 80 farm labor unions with 60,000
members.

Its main goals were to assist and advise the revolutionary

government in constructing a program of agrarian reform that would maintain
pre-1979 production levels and to establish a peasant movement founded on
Sandinista principles. 36

35

In the interest of these two campesino-related objectives for agrarian
reform, the MIDINRA launched its second reform policy initiativein 1981, a
program of increased farm mechanization partly as a response to a labor
shortage that had developed after the civil-war.

The plan involved the

large-scale employment of mechanical harvesters, but only on cotton fields as
they could not be used on the rugged terrain of the coffee plantations.
Unfortunately, mechanization was not widely successful because in addition to
its limited harvesting capabilities, the machinery had to be imported, thus
absorbing Nicargua's minimal foreign exchange earnings.

As cotton prices

fell on the international market during the early 1980s, importation of
expensive machinery and the depletion of the country's capital represented
an increasingly dysfunctional set of circumstances.
The third major Sandinista agrarian reform policy was the BEP
(Batallones Estudiantiles de Producci6n) voluntary labor program announced
in 1983.

Volunteer laborers were recruited from government offices,

workplaces, and particularly from schools and universities.

Like the

Literacy Crusade, the BEP program depended on the success of nation-wide
mass appeal to form a collective effort for the 1984/85 harvest.

The program

relied heavily on moral incentives as it did not produce any significant
material incentives.

Because of tremendous social pressure to join, however,

over 20,000 students volunteered their labor to further the goals of the
revolution. 37

The program was relatively successful in harvesting many of

the crops that would otherwise have been left to rot in the fields. Such a
high level of volunteer support, however, could not be sustained (especially
in 1985 with the increase in Contra attacks on farm workers).
Sandinista agrarian reform achieved its greatest successes between 1979
and 1984 with the mixed-model agricultural sector producing its highest
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growth rate of 15 percent in 1983.

Its major shortcoming, however, was its

failure to develop a viable policy solution to the problem of landless
campesinos who were not members of cooperatives.

After 1984, frequent

Contra attacks began to seriously affect levels of agricultural production and
to discourage landless peasants from joining state farms and cooperatives for
fear they would become victims of counterrevolutionary violence. 38

Levels of

output decreased throughout the period of Contra activity in the countryside
until the 1987 cease-fire, and continued sporadically thereafter.
Furthermore, the agrarian reform was unable to achieve food self-sufficiency
despite import substitution, export diversification, and production policies.
The agrarian measures, therefore, carried more subjective value in their
ability to gain popular support, volunteer labor, and cooperation from
workers organizations.

In objective terms, Nicaragua's continued reliance on

exporting coffee and cotton and its failure to produce the expensive
products it imported ultimately doomed the Sandinistas to economic failure.
Although the industrial sector had traditionally been of little
significance when compared with its agricultural counterpart, it had met with
rather encouraging gains during the 1960s.

This was due largely to its

ability to export goods to the CACM and to the investment in manufacturing
by the Somocista elites. 38

Industry suffered a major slump during the

1970s, however, as worldwide economic recession shrunk the regional market
for the country's manufacturing exports.

The decade of the seventies also

brought civil war that damaged and destroyed a large segment of the
industrial base.

Industrial production had virtually ceased during the last

several months of the insurrection given that much of the fighting during
the Final Offensive was carried on between the National Guard and factory
workers-turned urban guerrillas on the streets of Managua and other
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industrial centers. 4 0

Nevertheless, Sandinista leaders were confident that

their economic recovery plan could rebuild manufacturing and develop a
strong profitable industrial sector for the new society.

They hoped to

attract foreign and domestic industrial investment in order to begin immediate
recovery.

That great infusion of international investment never materialized.

Much like their early agrarian program, the initial Sandinista industrial
prokram involved large-scale expropriation.

In the months follwing "The

Triumph", 30 percent of the country's manufacturing sector was nationalized
although, because of later concessions made with the bourgeoisie, the
proportion of privately-owned industry remained at a constant level
throughout the 1980s. 41

The revolutionary government also initiated state

industrial investments that created urban jobs and unemployment was
reduced from 28 percent in 1979 to 17 percent in 1980.

Initial FSLN policy

during the period following the victory did manage to produce a respectable
12 percent gain for industrial production in 1980, but it was unable to
repeat this feat in the years following.

As a result, urban employment

figures for 1989 were nearly the same as they had been ten years earlier
during the insurrection. 42

By the mid-1980s the situation for both state and

private-owned manufacturing firms was dismal with little chance of
improvement given the growing military expense and destruction incurred by
the regime as a result of the Contra war and the increasingly bleak future
for the attraction of additional investment.
The Sandinista industrial plan was never able to achieve the kind of
objective or subjective gains that occurred in the agrarian and social
sectors.

Perhaps the single greatest obstacle to industrial growth was the

utter lack of investment, foreign or domestic, to rebuild, update, and
expand existing facilities.

The private industrial sector within Nicaragua
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was reluctant to invest in the post-revolution economy because of its
inherent instability and dependence. 42

Another factor was the serious

shortage of foreign exchange needed to import the machinery, supplies, and
raw materials that Nicaragua was unable to produce.

These factors,

together with the lack of anticipated foreign investment produced little hope
for prosperity.

Finally, the state-owned manufacturing sector revealed

serious weaknesses in Sandinista policy because even though some industries
were owned by the government, they operated in a free market without a
system of strict economic planning.

The Somozas' factories had been

confiscated, but could not be made to run efficiently.

A system of state-run

firms that produced goods unable to compete with private enterprise on the
free market obviously could not create the "mixed economy" for which the
Ministry of Industry had hoped. 43

Consequently, Sandinista industrial

program came to be characterized by dysfunctional policy and revolutionary
failure.
In addition to the major domestic barriers to economic reconstruction
and recovery, post-revolutionary Nicaragua was soon faced with a variety of
international constraints as well.

In the early 1980s, just as the new society

was beginning to emerge, the legacy of foreign domination and intervention,
especially from the United States, returned to haunt it.

Nicaragua did

develop beneficial economic and political ties with Cuba stemming from the
pre-revolution relationship between the FSLN and Fidel Castro as well as
from similar ideological goals and objectives.

Immediately following the

Triumph, Cuba responded with large-scale humanitarian aid sending food,
medical supplies, and hospital personnel to relieve the war-torn nation. 44
Total aid from the Cubans between 1979 and 1982 totaled $286 million in
emergency economic and technical assistance which was used for health,.
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education, reconstruction, industrial development, and infrastructure.

In

fact, the most significant international economic commitment to
post-revolutionary Nicaragua was that made by Cuba.
The Sandinistas also cultivated an economic relationship with the Soviet
Union from which they received additional emergency aid, economic
assistance, and trade. 45

This assistance accelerated markedly in 1981 after

the U. S. economic boycott was announced; in that year Nicaragua was
granted $50 million in Soviet trade credits in order to import much neede
machinery.

Soviet aid increased during the deacde of Sandinista rule and

some sources claim that Nicaragua received almost one million dollars per day
in trade credits and material goods.

When combined with supplemental aid

from Cuba, estimates of Eastern Bloc humanitarian, economic, and military
assistance for the 1980s reached one billion dollars per year. 46
Aid from communist governments, however, carried a heavy price.
Beginning in 1981 the United States commenced a major nine-year effort to
destabilize the Nicaraguan economy in the hopes of bringing down the
Sandinista government.

In April of that year, President Reagan announced

his decision to terminate aid to Nicaragua thereby dashing all hopes of
receiving the $75 million aid package approved by the Congress less than six
months earlier. 47

Also in 1981, the Reagan administration set into motion its

plan to prevent the post-revolutionary government from trading
internationally, therefore hastening the regime's collapse and ordered aU. S.
economic blockade of Nicaragua. 48

The U. S. imposition of sanctions

worsened as the decade progressed and in 1985 Reagan ordered a total
embargo on U. S. trade with the country.

In addition to trade sanctions,

the U. S. forced the termination of loans from the World Bank and the

40

Inter-American Development Bank in an effort to produce rapid economic
collapse. 49
The most crippling U. S. economic policy did not come in the form of
sanctions, however; it was manifest in the U. S. -engineered Contra war
against Nicaragua.

For the already fragile economy, the cost of fighting a

nearly eight-year insurgency was devastating not only in terms of human
lives and money spent, but also in lost productivity.

The CIA-sponsored

couterrevolutionary attacks began in 1982 and escalated steadily until
fighting reached the level of full-scale civil war by 1984 and was sustained
for almost four years.

In addition to committing a major portion of its

already-limited budget resources in an attempt at relieving the dire economic
situation, by 1986 the Sandinista government was spending 50 percent of its
treasury on anti-Contra defense.

Compounding this enormous depletion of

the annual GDP was the drastic reduction in commodities production. 50

By

1984 Nicaragua had lost over $285 million in agricultural production due to
the war as state-owned collectives became the repeated victims of Contra
attacks that resulted in the burning of thousands of acres of cultivated land
and the killing of the campesinos who worked on it.

Over 40,000

Nicaraguans were killed in the U. S. proxy war, a huge loss of human
resouces for a nation of only four million people. 51

The Contra strategy was

particularly damaging to the country's infrastructure, much of which had
only recently been rebuilt following the war for liberation.
Although U. S. sanctions and international economic pressure did
succeed in cutting off substantial amounts of income for the Sandinista
government, trade sanctions were largely mitigated because of increased aid
from Cuba and the Soviet Union.

The economic effects of U.S. Contra

policy, however, proved to be extremely damaging.
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Production levels fell

dramatically during the 1982-85 period of the most intense fighting and the
need for defense spending continued to escalate.

Sandinista political

economy could not withstand these continued pressures and by the time an
initial cease-fire agreement was made, the Nicaraguan economy was in ruins.
By the late 1980s, the Nicaraguan economy was experiencing tremendous
domestic and international pressure that called for the imposition of drastic
policy changes in an attempt to avert total economic collapse.

In 1988,

President Daniel Ortega announced a series of radical policy shifts including
austerity measures and a significant departure from earlier socialist rhetoric.
By the time the emergency program was developed total output of the
economy had dropped below the output levels of the 1960s, per capita income
had fallen 17 percent since the 1979 victory, and unemployment had reached
23 percent.

The always serious problem of decapitalization persisted and the

treasury was forced into printing cordobas to the extent that the annual
inflation rate had reached an incredible 20,000 precent by 1988. 52

The

Sandinista policymakers had no choice but to implement an austerity plan
that was ultimately criticized not only for its ideological shift but also for its
objective failure.
The most significant policy shift came with the announcement of the
program of concertaci<~n (convergence), literally the uniting of politics and
economy to accomplish the single goal of post-civil war recovery and
reconstruction.

In practical terms, the plan involved defining the

boundaries of the different economic sectors and their participants, as well
as obtaining the cooperation of representatives from the government,
industry, agriculutre, and labor. 53

Through compromise on such issues as

wage and price controls and competition between public and private sectors,
the govenrment hoped to stimulate production and control inflation.
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· / called for the
Specifically, and most controversially, concertaclOn
introduction of market mechanisms, the reduction of state economic
intervention, and more government cooperation with capitalist groups. Ortega
and other leading Sandinistas soon came under attack, however, both from
the organizations on the left, and from the middle sectors as it appeared
that the latter groups' ability to survive in the mixed economy was becoming
increasingly unlikely.

Critics from the left charged that concertacibn

involved the forfeiture of socialist goals, while the more laissez faire factions
viewed it as a plan to divide private interests in favor of more socialist
measures. 54
In addition, more conventional austerity plans were put in place that
year.

The harsh reform package included the reduction and eventual

cessation of government subsidies for the consumption of imports through a
multiple exchange rate structure.

Although this caused the consumer price

of imported goods to soar and forced the rationing of some commodities, it
did reduce the fiscal deficit.

The plan decreased government spending

across the board including defense, health, and social welfare, and the
reduction of capital investment for development.

Finally, the government

instituted strict monetary reform and devalued the cordoba first by 3,000
percent in February, then by 9,000 percent in June. 55

The early optimism

of the Ministry of Planning for economic reorganzation had given way to
economic disaster.

It had become painfully obvious that despite the

significant gains made in the areas of social welfare, the revolutionary
economy of the "new Nicaragua" had been a failure.
Political Conditions and Policy
The political climate of the envisioned "new Nicaragua" represents one
of the clearest examples of departure from the more typical political culture
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characteristics under the Somocistas.

The Sandinista revolutionary movement

was founded on principles related to a freer and more equitable
socio-political system for the mass base, including access to the basic
necessities for survival and, in general, humane treatment of Nicaraguan
citizens.

Their primary vehicles for achieving these goals were mass-based

political, social, and labor organizations that united under the banner of the
Sandinista Front to overthrow Somoza.

Following the Triumph, these

organizations become the channels of participation through which the people
took part in the new society.

Human rights moved to the forefront of

political concerns in the wake of the overthrow of a 46-year regime of
repression and brutality.

This was a primary concern for many Nicaraguans

and the Sandinista leaders who wanted to make a clear break with the past
and focus on reconstruction rather than revenge.
They were generally supported by the Catholic Church which, in
general shared the Sandinista goal of creating a more equitable society.
Particularly in the initial three years of the revolution the FSLN and the
Church enjoyed a mutually beneficial relationship not often found in marxist
revolutionary systems.

In foreign policy, the Sandinistas hoped to close ·the

chapter on their legacy of dependency and initially pursued an official policy
of non-alignment.

The new government made a conscious effort to portray

their ideology and policy as a fundamental rejection of those of the Somoza
dynasty.

Political participation following the Triumph was based on the

concept of poder popular (popular power) which stressed mass-based
participation through grass-roots organizations, worker control of farms and
factories, and government consultation with the leaders of these groups. 56
Such practices were absolutely forbidden under Somoza but necessary for the
Sandinistas if they were to maintain wide popular support.
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Farm labor

organizations like the ATC were consulted by the MIDINRA on agrarian
policy issues and CAUS (the major trade union) gave policy input to the
Ministry of Industry.

Although the Sandinista government was not

recognized as a liberal democratic system, its leaders initially demonstrated
their commitment to pluralism and the will of the majority in the elections
held in 1984. 57

Given their history of authoritarian military dictatorships,

there was no cause or tendency on the part of the Sandinista leaders to
attempt to set up a liberal democratic system.

The governing junta was

acutely aware of the general demands of the majority of the largely agrarian
and poor population: agrarian reform and freedom from oppression.

The

most effective means to deliver these immediate needs, therefore, was to
co-opt the support and advice of the organizations to which the people
belonged.
In the initial years of the revolution when the Sandinistas popularity
was very high, most of the mass-based organizations were affiliated with the
FSLN party.

By the mid -1980s, however, as opposition to the Sandinistas

grew, the number of parties across the ideological spectrum increased over
twenty. Sa

Fully confident in the support of the people, the governing junta

promised to hold elections by 1985.

Under the Law of Political Parties, the

revolutionary government recognized opposition parties as legitimate and gave
them the right of competitive political participation for the first time in
Nicaragua's history.

Elections were held in 1984, and with 75 percent of

registered voters participating the FSLN received 66 percent of the
presidential vote and 63 percent of the votes for the National Assembly,
reinforcing their claim to a mandate. 59

Despite the Reagan administration's

accusation that the FSLN had prevented the participation of any effective
opposition party, most evidence suggests that the withdrawl of the opposition
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was more a function of U. S. pressure and incentives than Sandinista
coercion.
The movement away from majority participation came not in the absence
of elections or the restriction of participation, but in the government's
growing need to protect itself from the encroaching Contra threat.

In 1983

General Ortega and the members of the junta declared a state of emergency
in response to increasing counterrevolutionary attacks, fearing they would
be overthrown before elections could be held.

Although the anti-Sandinsita

press was censored, freedom of speech restricted, and arrests increased,
most of those detained were accused of directly supporting
counterrevolutionary activity, and therefore, presented a legitimate threat to
the survival of the government.
In light of the Contra presence and subsequent civil war, the
revolutionary government was confronted with a contradictory dilemma of its
commitment to human rights and the preservation of internal security.

In an

early attempt to demonstrate their effort to prevent the recurrence of the
atrocities committed under the Somozas, the junta invited representatives of
Amnesty International and Americas Watch to survey their regime.

They

received quite favorable reports particularly in comparison to the
U.S.-backed governments of their neighbors in Guatemala and El Salvador. GO
These organizations did raise questions, however, about the military's use of
short-term detainment of individuals suspected of subversive activity.
Notably absent was the government-condoned torture, execution, and
disappearances that had characterized the activity of the Somocista National
Guard.

One of the first actions of the new government was to abolish the

death penalty.

Even those National Guardsmen convicted of murder, rape,
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or torture were given only the maximum sentence of 30 years in prison, and
the vast majority had been released or pardoned by 1989. 61
The Sandinistas faced a major social and political obstacle concerning
the maintenance of internal security and law enforcement among the general
population.

Following the 1979 Triumph, Somoza loyalists and remnants of

the Guard remained a potential source of counterrevolutionary violence,
although most had fled across the borders to Honduras and Costa Rica.

In

addition, most of the people were heavily armed after the insurrection and
crime levels were high immediately following the July victory.

The

revolutionary government was inexperienced in police functions but instituted
several measures to combat the security problem.

FSLN patrols were

ordered to rid the country of remaining Somocistas forcing them to go into
exile or be imprisoned.

A national campaign of depistolization was begun to

reduce the number of civilians owning and carrying weapons.

Hundreds of

police officers were fired for using excessive force and foreign experts were
brought in to train those remaining in the performane of their duties in a
humane and effective manner. 62
Human rights and internal security concerns grew as the civil war
fighting intensified between 1984 and 1987.

Although the government

Eje'rcito Popular Sandinista (EPS) was forced to employ increasingly
repressive tactics in order to maintain the government in the face of an
overthrow and put down counterrevolutionary activity, the majority of the
most flagrant violations of human rights were reported to have been
committed by the Contras.

Of course the government could not prevent all

individual acts of excessive violence or cruelty, but the Sandinistas did
uphold their commitment to maintaining a humane society and never resorted
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to the death squads and executions employed by other governments fighting
insurgents in the region.
Discussion of the position of the Church and religion during the
Sandinista period largely consists of the relationship between the
revolutionary government and the two segments (official and popular) of the
Catholic Church.

The Church and its followers were a formidable force in

the revolution as parish priests and campesinos contributed a great deal to
the opposition movement either by taking up arms themselves, or by
speaking out to others who would.

Even the official hierarchy, despite its

traditional alliance with the Somoza family elite and its commitment to the
status quo, sided with the movement against the dictator in the interest of
social justice and their followers living in abject poverty.

Following the

Triumph, however, the Church experienced an internal division over support
for the marxist system that was emerging.

This split had important

implications for the Sandinistas in a country where the Church remained a
significant political force with considerable influence in society.
The people's, or popular Church's primary vehicles of revolutionary
activity were the Christian Base Communities (CEBs) endorsed by the
bishops as a means of bringing religion into the revolution.

The Base

Communities were engaged in social welfare activity, and their members'
actions in the revolutionary movement were communicated to the bishops in
order to keep the latter abreast of developments, especially in more rural
parishes removed from the urban-based hierarchy. 63

At the official Church

level, the relationship between the hierarchy and the emerging Sandinista
government was mutually cooperative.

In fact, in 1979 then-Archbishop

Miguel Obando y Bravo, the official leader of the Nicaraguan Catholic
Church, and his Council of Bishops publicly endorsed the new government,
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in return for which the Sandinista leadership assured Church officials that
the regime's commitments would not threaten their religious institutions. 64
The following year, the FSLN ratified the "Document on Religion" which
guaranteed complete religious freedom and the party also appointed several
Church officials to positions within the new government.

The Church-State

alliance was short-lived, however, as the official Church became the
international target of anti-Sandinista efforts.

Both the Vatican and the

U. S., particularly the CIA, developed ties to Cardinal Obando y Bravo
during the early 1980s.

Under Pope John Paul II, the Vatican pursued an

international policy designed to discourage nuns, priests, and other
ecclesiastical officials from engaging in political activity or taking positions in
governments.

This policy was aimed at a more progressive development in

Latin America as a whole, liberation theology, in which Church officials
became active advocates for the poor and members of revolutionary
movements.

Such had been the case in Nicaraguain the post-Second Vatican

Council era.
In 1983 the Pope visited Nicaragua and expressed his displeasure with
liberation theology urging Nicaraguan Catholics to join the movement of
Cardinal Obando y Bravo who had become the head of the Catholic opposition
to the Sandinista government in accordance with the wishes Vatican
wishes. 65

As for Washington's relationship with the hierarchy, the CIA and

right-wing religious groups financially supported the activities of Church
officials and used the Contras to exploit the religious issue, internationally
portraying the Sandinistas as left-wing persecutors of the Church.

The

government was in fact, rather tolerant of criticism from religious leaders,
save for its efforts to censor the zealous remarks of Cardinal Obando y
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Bravo and the expulsion of a bishop for lobbying the U. S. Congress in
support of Contra aid .....
These pressures from Washington and Rome widened the split between
the popular Church and its followers and the Church hierarchy and the
Vatican.

Most parish-level Church officials ignored orders from above and

continued their work in popular volunteer efforts for the country's
reconstruction and beyond.

Most of the political damage to the Sandinista

government by the Church, therefore, came at the international level where
opposition to the regime used the Church issue to foster multilateral support
for the counterrevolutionary effort.

This conflicting policy has actually been

more politically damaging to the Catholic Church as many of its members,
especially in poor areas, grew weary of the religious infighting and
converted to various rapidly growing evangelical sects.
As was the case in the domestic political arena, Nicaragua's foreign
policy represented a clean break with the legacy of the Somozas and almost a
century of domination by the United States.

The junta made clear its official

policy of non-alignment, although its economic relationship with Cuba and the
Soviet Union would later suggest a lapse in this commitment.

As the decade

progressed, the Reagan administration's position moved from antagonistic to
open hostility until it became known that the United States was funding the
Contra insurgency in an attempt to overthrow the Sandinista government.
Fueling their nine-year conflict was the Sandinistas regional policy of
providing material and diplomatic support to leftist guerrillas in EI Salvador
and Guatemala fighting against the U. S. -supported, right-wing military
government.

This novel foreign policy by a once-vassal state was in fact, a

major cause of U. S. intervention through the Contras that severely weakened
the Sandinista regime.
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The nearly nine-year series of actions that would constitute U. S.
Contra policy was largely a function of President Reagan and his top
administration officials' preoccupation and obsession with ousting the
government that had thrown out Somoza.

Contra policy began in November

1981 when Reagan announced his support for counterrevolutionary forces,
initially comprised of exiled National Guardsmen based in Honduras. 67

This

policy was declared in response to persistent intelligence reports of
Sandinista assistance to leftist guerrillas in El Salvador.
National Directorate

Although the FSLN

later debated such aid to its Central American neighbor

for almost a year and emphatically denied any support for them, by late
1980, the Sandinistas made one of their first and most crucial major foreign
policy decisions, the sending of weapons to the Salvadorans. 6a

This action

was all the justification that hardliner anti-communists in the Reagan
administration needed to justify huge aid package proposals for the Contra
forces.
The Contra insurgency forces, based primarily in Honduras, served as
the proxy army of the United States in its undeclared war on post-Somoza
Nicaragua.

They received a total of $390.7 million in direct U. S.

government aid, assistance through the illegal "Iran-Contra" National
Security Council network, and U. S. insurance and loans between 1982 and
1989 despite Congress' temporary halt on all aid to the Contras in 1984 and
its indefinite ban on military aid. aa
1982 and continued through 1987.

Attacks on Nicaragua began in force in
The heaviest and most damaging

offensives occurred in 1983 and 1984 when sea and air-based attacks on vital
economic infrastructure and industry were carried out, including the
internationally denounced CIA -engineered mining of Nicaraguan harbors. 70
Much of the damage sustained in these attacks was irreparable as the
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Sandinista government was forced to allocate greater percentages of its
severely limited budget to fight Contra ground battles in the Honduran
border region.
The U. S. Contra policy was economically and morally exhausting for the
Nicaraguan regime.

Although the insurgency effort was rendered powerless

once U. S. aid was severed, the government continued to struggle and
founder with the economic, social, and political problems caused by the war
up until the time of their electoral defeat in 1990.

It is unlikely that the

Sandinistas' foreign policy could have prevented U. S. intervention through
the Contras had they refrained from fostering friendly relations with the
Soviet bloc or refused to aid the Salvadoran guerrillas.

At most, their

foreign policy agenda accelerated the inevitable attack by the United States
that compelled the Reagan administration to pursue Contra policy more
zealously and with more support from ultra-conservative domestic elements in
the United States.

At any rate, Nicaragua was again faced with the task of

reconstruction when military operations were suspended in 1988. 7 '
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CONCLUSION:
THE SANDINISTA FAILURE AND THE FUTURE OF NICARAGUA
Foreign Policy and the Contra War
Sandinista foreign policy, .particularly with respect to its result in major
warfare with the Contra forces, heavily damaged its credibility and ability to
survive.

Yet, its decision to send military aid to EI Salvador, while it did

incite the wrath of the Reagan administration, may have appeared as a
realistic solution to the problem of the real or perceived Central American
right-wing threat to its fragile security.

The new government was fully

aware that remnants of the National Guard and Somoza Debayle himself
remained just over the Nicaraguan borders.

Seeking a leftist revolutionary

ally in EI Salvador, the Sandinistas made the decision to aid guerrilla forces
there, perhaps reasoning that such a relationship would be necessary to
protect itself from counterrevolutionary threats in the region.

At any rate,

the Salvadoran policy did serve as a red flag for the U. S. to unleash its
Contra policy against the Sandinistas.

Nicaragua's ties to Cuba and the

Soviet Union served a similar function in internationally labelling Nicaragua
as a potential communist satellite and a vehicle for Communist expansionism
in the Western Hemisphere.
Legacy of Monocultural Economics and Dependency
The most plausible explanation for the failure of the Sandinista regime
is that they were unable to transform their economy to the same degree that
they had been able to transform the social and political arenas.

A new

Nicaragua had begun to emerge with revolutionary policies that produced
significant gains in education, health care, and housing.

Political reform

had transformed the country from its existence as the virtual Somoza family
kingdom into a revolutionary polity with increased political participation and

53

societal freedoms.

Ten years after the Triumph, however, Nicaragua

remained a monocultural economy subject to the vagaries of the international
market.

The inability to produce necessary finished goods compounded their

dependency as they were forced increasingly to import expensive industrial
products they could ill-afford.

Huge foreign trade imbalances left the

economy trapped in a state of dependency with their only source of income
being subject to the whims of the agroexport market.
The government was hard pressed to decide whether to fulfill FSLN
promises relative to its revolutionary commitment giving Nicaragua's
campesinos the land they had fought for in the insurgency or to invest its
scarce monetary and policy resources in industry.

While the industrial

sector held the country's only prospect for economic diversification and
decreased dependence on foreign buyers, supporters of the revolution
wanted land to farm and assistance from the government to do so.

Fearing a

great loss in credibility, the Sandinista government opted for the more
politically favorable, but much less economically prudent policy of
distributing land to rural peasant farm workers and implementing a crude
agrarian reform at the expense of an underdeveloped industrial sector.
Their agrarian policy absorbed its precious hard currency resources on
inefficient farm machinery for agroexport crops.

Although these resources

could have been invested in industry and economic diversification, they
instead perpetuated Nicaragua's dependence on its major export crops.
A major economic goal of the revolution was to break the historic
socio-political legacy of dependency.

A decade later, however, Nicaragua

remained dependent primarily on coffee, which today accounts for at least 50
percent of its export revenues annually.

Efforts to produce cotton and

other export crops only superficially changed the equations.
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The

Sandinistas did in fact break their historic dependent relationship with the
United States, only to shift that dependence to Cuba and the Soviet Union;
the players changed but the game did not.

This dependency continued to

leave Sandinista Nicaragua's economy subject to market trends that precluded
long-term stability.

Sustained economic chaos ultimately overshadowed

successes in other areas and ultimately led to the Sandinistas' downfall.
1990 Elections and Violeta Chamorro
At a glance it seems almost ironic that ten years after great masses of
Nicaraguans took up arms to overthrow the Somoza dictatorship and the
elitist, personalistic system it stood for, the nation would embrace Violeta
Barrios de Chamorro, Dona Violeta, as their hope for the future.

The

daughter of a wealthy cattle rancher, educated in the U. S., and the widow
of La Prensa editor Pedro Joaqu{n Chamorro, she appeared at face value to
be an unlikely candidate for the presidency of a revolutionary society based
on marxist principles.

Like her husband, Mrs. Chamorro had been a

long-time leader in the intellectual and upper class opposition to the
Somozas, a supporter of the revolutionary movement, and a founding member
of the FSLN governing junta.

For a people heavily influenced by myth and

tradition, she embodies the spirit of her late husband and the fight against
Somoza oppression that elevated him to both symbol and hero through the
period of the revolution to the 1990 election.

Violeta Chamorro's own

personal conviction compelled her to leave the junta after less than one year
over her disagreement with their plans for a more controlling and orthodox
Marxist regime, and her staunch opposition to press censorship.

She

returned to La Prensa where she continued to speak out against limits on
free speech and provided a voice for opposition to the Sandinista government
despite its repeated attempts to shut the newspaper down.'
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Dona Violeta

and her supporters forged the 14-party coalition that became the National
Opposition Union (UNO) in the summer of 1989, promising to bring economic
and political liberation to a people who had grown weary of civil war and
desperation.

UNO collected a resounding 55 percent of the vote in the 1990

election despite international predictions of another Sandinista victory. 2
The UNO administration moved quickly to restore civil liberties and
reduce the size of the army in an attempt to solidify popular support.
Despite Dona Violeta's enormous personal popularity, however, the first year
of her presidency was riven with political and economic crisis.

As the

president of the ATC expressed that group's position, " ... you can't eat
freedom of expression."

Labor unrest over generally desperate financial

conditions for all Nicaraguans resulted in a May 1990 strike and riot of civil
servants less than one month after the election. 3

In September 1991,

controversy raged over legislation that called for the return of property
given away in desperation by the Sandinistas before they formally turned
power over to the UNO government.

Although Chamorro vetoed the bill and

called it unconstitutional, her UNO supporters began to question her ability
to withstand pressure from the still prevalent Sandinistas opposition.

It

appeared as though her presidency had become a political balancing act
between her coalition and the ousted Sandinistas.
Economically the Nicaraguans remain in a desperate situation.

Although

the U. S. immediately lifted its embargo and promised to renew economic aid
after the Chamorro victory, decreased aid from the Eastern Bloc will leave
the nation's huge debt unpaid.

President Chamorro declared her country

bankrupt in May 1990 seeking an emergency loan from the United States.

A

steady negative percentage change in the GNP from 1984 on, and an inflation
rate of 35,000 percent by 1989 left the new government with a meager $3
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million in the national treasury at the time of the inauguration."

The hope

of heavily increased private investment remained unfulfilled as investors
feared the instability of Nicaragua's economy and the threat of another civil
war.

Despite the initial support for the UNO government, the patience of

the people appears to be virtually at an end.

After ten years of economic

and political turmoil, the vast majority of Nicaraguans are desperate for a
government that can bring about peace and financial stability.

With the

current worldwide recession and general decline of foreign aid from wealthier
nations. the probability of rapid improvement is not terribly great.

In spite

of their personal admiration for Dona Violeta, Nicaraguans may again decide
"to vote their stomachs, not their hearts. "..
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